Submitted by Renee Parsons<\/p>\n
As the Ukraine war continues its corruption of violence, death and destruction threatening to morph into a more widespread WW III scenario, it would be essential to understand that the Ukraine war began to stave off the threat of NATO expansion<\/span><\/a> on the Russian border.<\/p>\n While the United States remains a major instigator of NATO, there continues to be little understanding of how a series of meetings in the 1990s to consider reunification of Germany contributed to the conflict and especially as reunification was considered an end to the Cold War. \u00a0 <\/span>The meetings occurred after dissolution of the Soviet Union and the GDR (German Democratic Republic) prompted reunification negotiations.<\/p>\n By 2017, a panel discussion on \u201cWho Promised What to Whom on NATO Expansion<\/i>\u201d released a stream of declassified documents entitled \u201cNATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard | National Security Archive<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0 <\/span>Those documents provided background for the following:\u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n In 1949 at the end WW II, Germany was split into two separate states as a symbol of the Cold War; West Germany was recognized by the US and western Europe with East Germany supported by the USSR.<\/p>\n While the fall of the Berlin Wall<\/span><\/a> (1989) was followed by the unexpected collapse<\/span><\/a> of the Soviet Union in 1991, the GDR dissolved itself requiring reintegration with Germany into one single sovereign country.<\/p>\n Given Russia\u2019s representation of the GDR, Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev\u2019s presence was required which began with European and American political foreign policy leaders tasked to approve reunification in 1990.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The public record is clear and unequivocal that the Russians were patronized with an abundance of perfunctory assurances by a panel of foreign policy professionals who offered repeated, if not ad nauseum, assurances that NATO would move \u2018not one inch eastward\u2019<\/i> toward the Russian border and that NATO transformation could conceivably bring Russia into the European family of nations.<\/p>\n Those assurances were rife throughout the National Archive records beginning with President George H.W. Bush in December, 1989 assuring Gorbachev<\/span><\/a> at the Malta Summit that the US \u201cwould not take advantage<\/i>\u201d of the revolutions in eastern Europe to \u201charm Soviet interests<\/i>.\u201d<\/p>\n Gorbachev\u2019s statement that \u201cNato expansion is unacceptable\u201d <\/i>set the tone while\u00a0 <\/span>US Secretary of State James Baker assured Gorbachev<\/span><\/a> that \u201cneither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place\u201d <\/i>and that \u2018not an inch of NATO\u2019s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.\u201d<\/i>\u00a0<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n \u201cWell-briefed by the American Secretary of State, West German Chancellor Kohl understood a key Soviet red line,\u00a0assuring Gorbachev in February 1990: \u201cWe believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n The infamous quote originated with Baker \u2018not one inch eastward<\/i>\u201d proved to be a great hustle to obtain Russia\u2019s agreement for a smooth, non controversial negotiation for the reunification of Germany<\/span><\/a>\u00a0 <\/span>in 1990.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told Baker on February 2, 1990, that\u00a0 <\/span>\u201cNATO would not extend its territorial coverage to the area of the GDR nor anywhere else in Eastern Europe<\/i>.\u201d<\/p>\n Former CIA Director Robert Gates\u2019 criticism cited\u00a0 <\/span>\u201cpressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward in 1990 when Gorbachev <\/i>\u2018was led to believe<\/span><\/a>\u00a0 <\/span>that would not happen<\/i>.\u201d<\/p>\n In January, 1990, Genscher, in a public speech offered \u201cchanges in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an<\/i> \u2018impairment of Soviet security interests\u201d <\/i>and that \u201cNATO should rule out an \u2018expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.\u2019<\/i>\u201d<\/p>\n By February 1990, Baker tried out his \u201cnot one inch eastward<\/i>\u201d mantra agreeing with Gorbachev\u2019s repeated assertion that \u201cNATO expansion is unacceptable.\u201d\u00a0 <\/span><\/i>It was Baker\u2019s off-quoted phrase that became a rallying cry for the assemblage of western elitists who pledged that the military NATO alliance would not bivouac on the Ukraine \u2013 Russian border.<\/p>\n When Baker communicated to German Chancellor Kohl that NATO\u2019s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position, Gorbachev responded that the Soviet leadership was giving thought to such options adding\u00a0 <\/span>\u201ccertainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n It was not until a flurry of diplomatic meetings that finalized a crucial meeting <\/span><\/a> between German Chancellor Kohl and Gorbachev included great sighs of relief when Kohl \u201cachieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification as long as NATO did not expand to the east<\/i>.\u201d<\/p>\n The Bush \u2013 Edward Schevardnadze conversation of May, 1990 included reference to a process that \u201cwould produce a new legitimate European structure \u2013 one that would be inclusive, not exclusive<\/i>\u201d raising the option that Russia could be considered a legitimate part of Europe.<\/p>\n By June 1990 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher <\/i>added \u201ctransformation of NATO towards a more political, less militarily threatening, alliance<\/i>\u201d to bring \u201cthe Soviet Union fully into discussion about the future of Europe.\u201d\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n In May 1990 in Moscow, Baker told Gorbachev that \u201ctransformation of NATO<\/i>, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account<\/i>.\u00a0\u201c.. today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n French leader Francois Mitterand was the only participant who articulated a preference\u00a0 <\/span>\u201cpersonally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs.<\/i>\u201d\u00a0 <\/span>In other words, he expressed no purpose for a continued NATO presence.<\/p>\n President Bush again promised Gorbachev the Moon..\u201c We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces. We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with <\/i>new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.\u201d<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n Even as the Russians considered NATO expansion an existential threat to its sovereignty, the Russians never expressed any hesitancy or doubt as they accepted carte blanche assurances without wondering how the Americans and the collective west had suddenly become so amenable, so utterly obliging and accommodating to Russia\u2019s objections to NATO expansion.<\/p>\n It was no secret that NATO had been founded as a geopolitical military alliance \u201cdeterring Soviet expansion<\/i>\u201d since April, 1949<\/span><\/a> when detonation of an atomic bomb further alienated western outreach to Russia prior to the 1990 unification negotiations. \u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In reading an ad nauseum history of assurances, it becomes apparent that the proponents of German reunification would have promised the Moon in order for Gorbachev to accept reunification;\u00a0 <\/span>thereby allowing multiple opportunities for Gorbachev to repeat his opposition to any eastward NATO movement.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Originally perceived as a counterweight to Soviet arms stationed in eastern and southern Europe after WW II, NATO reconceived itself following German reunification as an end to the Cold War with talk of NATO being \u2018transformed\u2019 into a \u2018cooperative-security<\/i>\u201d organization.<\/p>\n The reunification of Germany predated continued US pushes for NATO expansion into 2014 when the democratically elected Ukraine President Yanukovych was ousted for refusing to join the EU;\u00a0 <\/span>military conflict exploded in the Donbas as Sen. John McCain on the stage in Kiev promised Ukraine NATO expansion after which Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a letter to NATO and the US seeking a diplomatic solution which was not forthcoming. \u00a0 <\/span>By February 2022, Russia initiated its Special Military Operation into Ukraine.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The reunification negotiations remain a brutal reminder of how easily\u00a0 <\/span>Putin and the Russians were played when the Minsk 1 (2014) and Minsk 2 (2015) agreements were deliberately stalled<\/span><\/a> by German Chancellor Angela Merkel providing Ukraine with a necessary opportunity to rearm and organize itself for the coming conflict.<\/p>\n Fast forward to March, 1997 as Russian President Boris Yeltsin told Clinton personally at Helsinki:\u00a0\u201cOur position has not changed.\u00a0It remains a <\/i>mistake for NATO to move eastward<\/i><\/span><\/a>.\u00a0But I need to take steps to alleviate the negative consequences of this for Russia.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n The question remains throughout the Gorbachev pandering whether there was any discussion about NATO\u2019s continued existence: if, in fact, Russia might be integrated into the European community as some suggested.\u00a0 <\/span>Why would a military alliance be justified when its numero uno purpose of \u201cdeterring Russian expansion<\/i>\u201d was contrary to the Russian Federation and why was NATO\u2019s continued existence deemed necessary.\u00a0 <\/span>If, in fact, the European suggestions that the Russian Federation might become part of the European community, what useful purpose created NATO\u2019s need to exist if, in fact, NATO was specifically \u201ctransformation of a more political NATO, less militarily threatening alliance? \u201c <\/i><\/p>\n Given the Clinton Administration\u2019s refusal to Boris Yeltsin to join NATO and then again in 2002 when new Russian President Vladimir Putin was also twice refused membership by the Clinton Administration.<\/p>\n The idea was to keep Russia in its place as an outcast, a foreign pariah, a less than legitimate participant within the European family of nations, ineligible to join the European community.\u00a0 <\/span>That as a formerly Communist nation, Russia could not be trusted to be accepted into Europe as an equal participant.<\/p>\n \u201cThe documents show that Gorbachev \u201cagreed to German unification in NATO as the result of this cascade of assurances,\u201d<\/i> and on the basis of his own analysis that the future of the Soviet Union depended on its \u201cintegration into Europe<\/i><\/span>.\u201d\u00a0 <\/span>In other words, that Russia could expect to be welcomed and participate with a greater Europe in the future. \u00a0 <\/span>Despite the pledges and assurances, none of that was ever going to happen.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n