{"id":18988,"date":"2025-05-05T08:24:37","date_gmt":"2025-05-05T12:24:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/?p=18988"},"modified":"2025-05-05T08:24:37","modified_gmt":"2025-05-05T12:24:37","slug":"prophetic-flashback-president-hoovers-signing-of-a-substantial-tariff-increase-in-1929-caused-the-great-depression","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/?p=18988","title":{"rendered":"<h2><b>PROPHETIC FLASHBACK: &#8216;President Hoover&#8217;s signing of a substantial tariff increase in 1929 caused the Great Depression&#8217;<\/b><\/h2>"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1>Everything Wrong with the Hoover Administration<\/h1>\n<p><!--more--><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-18989\" src=\"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Screen-Shot-2025-05-05-at-8.21.05-AM.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"682\" height=\"205\" srcset=\"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Screen-Shot-2025-05-05-at-8.21.05-AM.png 682w, https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Screen-Shot-2025-05-05-at-8.21.05-AM-300x90.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 682px) 100vw, 682px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Vincent Geloso<\/p>\n<footer class=\"flexible-regions__sidebar flexible-regions__sidebar-top\">\n<div class=\"author-bio spacer--standard--bottom spacer--nomargin--last-child\">\n<div class=\"teaser-blurb text-sm p-mb-last-child-0\">\n<h4>Vincent Geloso is an assistant professor of economics at George Mason University. He holds a\u00a0Ph.D. in Economic History from the London School of Economics. He is the author of\u00a0<em>Du Grand Rattrapage au D\u00e9clin Tranquille: Une histoire \u00e9conomique et sociale du Qu\u00e9bec de 1900 \u00e0\u00a0nos jours<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<em>Rethinking Canadian Economic Growth and Development since 1900: The Quebec Case<\/em>.<\/h4>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/footer>\n<section class=\"flexible-regions__content flexible-regions__content-bottom\">\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Herbert Hoover, the thirty-\u200bfirst President of the United States, who occupied the White House from 1929 to 1933, generally falls near the bottom of presidential rankings. However, his position in those rankings is not due to his forgettability as a\u00a0president (unlike Rutherford B. Hayes or Chester Alan Arthur). In fact, he is one of the most discussed presidents.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Why such a\u00a0contradiction? Because he is frequently used as a\u00a0boogeyman to be trotted out against \u201cdo-\u200bnothing-\u200bism\u201d when a\u00a0crisis emerges. Depicted as a\u00a0passive actor with regard to both the onset of the Great Depression and its remedies, no politician wants to be compared with Hoover. Few political boogeymen are as efficient as Hoover.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Hoover, who had long been associated with the more progressive wing of the Republican Party (he had even pondered a\u00a0run as a\u00a0Democrat in 1920)<sup>[1]<\/sup>, was a\u00a0proactive president who proposed numerous government actions in response to the Great Depression. This was in marked contrast to earlier recessions.<sup>[2]<\/sup>\u00a0Many of those actions deepened the downturn. Some economic historians even claim that his signing of a\u00a0substantial tariff increase in 1929\u00a0<em>caused<\/em>\u00a0the Great Depression. Hoover\u2019s missteps weren\u2019t limited to economic policy. Once he became president, Hoover ignored his earlier views with regards to race relations and fought against anti-\u200blynching bills. Overall, Hoover was\u00a0<em>not\u00a0<\/em>an inactive president. He was immensely proactive and many of his actions caused significant harm.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<h2 id=\"brief-overview-great-depression\" class=\"heading spacer--heading\">A Brief Overview of the Great Depression<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>A discussion of the origins of the Great Depression is necessary to understand the mischaracterization of Hoover as a\u00a0do-\u200bnothing president. First, the Great Depression was an exceptionally large contraction. Figure 1\u00a0below illustrates the level of living standards (GDP per capita) during the Great Depression as a\u00a0share of what it would have been had it continued on the same trend as from 1865 to 1929. Notice the depth at 1933\u2014a ratio of 0.65 (i.e., 65%). This is a\u00a0substantial deviation from the long-\u200brun trend in growth. Notice also the duration\u2014the economy never returns to trend (which would be represented at returning to the level of 1\u00a0on the graph). To understand the momentousness of that contraction, contrast Figure 1\u00a0with Figure 2\u00a0which shows the experience of the 1921 recession. Up until that point, the 1921 recession had been one of America\u2019s deepest. However, it was nowhere as deep nor was it as long-\u200blasting. By 1923, the economy was back on trend, whereas the economy had not yet recovered from the Great Depression a\u00a0decade after the initial contraction.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Economic historians who study the Great Depression are interested in explaining three separate issues: The first is the origin of the contraction (which corresponds to the downturn from 1929). The second is the depth of the recession (why did it go as low as what was observed in 1933). The third is the duration (why did the economy fail to recover by 1939). Of those three issues, Hoover\u2019s presidency speaks to the first two. The latter issue is of greater relevance to Roosevelt\u2019s presidency.<sup>[3]<\/sup>\u00a0As such, we can assess the Hoover administration\u2019s economic legacy by asking: a) what was Hoover\u2019s contribution to initiating the Great Depression; and b) what did Hoover do to worsen the downturn?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"container-width-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"standout-wrapper spacer--extra standout-wrapper--default\">\n<figure class=\"figure responsive-embed-no-margin-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"figure__media\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"image-style-optimize component-image\" src=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/optimize\/public\/2022-09\/hoover_geloso.png?itok=gAX7RKqo\" alt=\"Figure 1: GDP per capita as share of 1865-1929 growth trend; Figure 2: GDP per capita as share of 1865-1920 growth trend\" width=\"448\" height=\"646\" \/><\/div><figcaption class=\"figure__caption spacer--top\">\n<div class=\"caption text-sm font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">\n<div class=\"caption text-sm font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">\n<p>Source: Maddison Project Database (2020)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<h2 id=\"plausible-still-debated-case-how-hoover-helped-cause-great-depression\" class=\"heading spacer--heading\">A Plausible, But Still Debated, Case for How Hoover Helped Cause the Great Depression<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>With regard to the issue of the origins of the downturn, most economists and economic historians hold the view that the blame is to be borne by the Federal Reserve.<sup>[4]<\/sup>\u00a0The finer details of the mechanism are in debate, but the core story is relatively well accepted. By allowing banks to fail throughout the country without increasing the monetary base, the Federal Reserve let the money supply contract rapidly causing deflation. In the presence of sticky prices and wages, the economy could not adjust by adjusting\u00a0<em>only\u00a0<\/em>prices. It had to adjust by decreasing output as well, which explains the depth of the recession. In that story, the Federal Reserve\u2019s inaction to the financial downturn of 1929 is the culprit to blame. Monetary policy explains it all. This dominating role for monetary policy appears to leave little to no room for assigning blame to Hoover as he was not in charge of monetary policy\u2014that was the purview of the Federal Reserve.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>However, some economists argue that Hoover did precipitate the contraction through the role of the Smoot-\u200bHawley tariff.<sup>[5]<\/sup>\u00a0Passed in 1930, the tariff caused the average duty on dutiable goods to go from 40 percent in 1929 to 59 percent in 1932.<sup>[6]<\/sup>\u00a0More than a\u00a0thousand economists signed a\u00a0letter demanding Hoover veto the tariff increase\u2014to no avail.<sup>[7]<\/sup>\u00a0At first glance, with international trade representing less than 5\u00a0percent of gross national product (GNP), the effect of a\u00a0tariff increase appears insufficient to explain the Great Depression. Many economic historians, while agreeing that the tariff caused harm, agree that it cannot explain the downturn, which is why some of them find that the tariff explained only roughly a\u00a0fifth of the increase in unemployment between 1929 and 1933.<sup>[8]<\/sup>\u00a0However, other economists counter that international trade as a\u00a0share of total output is a\u00a0misleading figure.<sup>[9]<\/sup>\u00a0This counterargument can be divided into two variants.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>First, if international trade was providing key intermediate goods, the tariffs distort the production of some final consumption goods. This is especially true in industries where it is difficult to find substitutes for imported intermediate goods. The result, according to this view, is that the tariff worsened the downturn dramatically. This first view suggests that the role of monetary policy in the initial downturn is exaggerated. While the tariff did not start the Great Depression, this first source of counterargument means that the initial contraction was in large part the result of Hoover\u2019s signing of the Smoot-\u200bHawley tariff. That first counterargument has gained traction within the profession and it is now widely accepted that the effects of the tariff might have been long underestimated.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>The second source of counterargument is one that ties the tariff\u2019s passing directly to the banking crisis. In the absence of the tariff, the contraction in the money supply would have caused deflation in the United States\u2014meaning that U.S. prices would have been lower relative to prices abroad. This would have allowed an increase in foreign demand for American goods and rising net exports\u2014thus compensating the contracting effect. The tariff prevented that mechanism from operating. In fact, because it actually increased American prices relative to prices abroad, the mechanism worked in the opposite direction: foreign countries cut back on importing American goods. This initiated a\u00a0chain reaction. First, the production of goods whose foreign demand fell most was geographically concentrated in the United States. Second, because banks in the United States were prohibited from operating branches in multiple regions of the country, the regionally-\u200bconcentrated downturns converted themselves into regionally-\u200bconcentrated bank failures. These bank failures then caused the money supply to contract. According to this second counterargument, monetary policy was not the proximate cause of the economic collapse; trade policy was. The contraction in the money supply was, according to this view, a\u00a0result of the tariff. The inaction of the Federal Reserve in order to offset that contraction would not have been as much of a\u00a0problem had it not been for the tariff. In other words, the tariff that Hoover signed\u2014according to that counterargument\u2014caused the Great Depression.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<h2 id=\"policies-commonly-understood-have-made-great-depression-worse\" class=\"heading spacer--heading\">Policies Commonly Understood to Have Made the Great Depression Worse<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>If there is a\u00a0debate over whether Hoover\u2019s policy decisions initiated the Great Depression, there is clear evidence that many of his decisions deepened the downturn. One such decision was the implementation of what came to be called the \u201chigh-\u200bwage doctrine.\u201d<sup>[10]<\/sup>\u00a0The doctrine essentially held that reducing wages during a\u00a0recession was counterproductive because it reduced the purchasing power of workers. As a\u00a0result, demand for goods that workers purchased would fall, and more unemployment would emerge. As one government official stated in 1930: \u201cin this enlightened age when it is recognized that production is dependent upon consuming power, it is my judgment that large manufacturers and producers maintain wages and salaries as being the farsighted and in the end most constructive thing to do.<sup>[11]<\/sup>\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>The problem with this doctrine is that it conflates nominal and real prices. As the main determinant of real wages is productivity, we should expect that real wages and productivity would increase in lockstep. As a\u00a0result, for a\u00a0given level of productivity, dividing the real wage rate by the real value of the output of an hour of work should always yield a\u00a0constant. If a\u00a0contraction in the money supply occurs and all prices can immediately adjust, there will be a\u00a0lower nominal wage rate. However, because the price level also falls, the ratio of real values is unchanged. The rub comes when there is uneven price rigidity\u2014i.e., prices of goods adjust more easily than wages for labor. When this happens, the contraction in the money supply causes the\u00a0<em>real\u00a0<\/em>wage rate to increase. While productivity (units per hour of work) is unchanged, the falling prices means that firms obtain less per unit of output. As a\u00a0result, firms cannot afford to keep workers on the payroll and have to fire many of them which, in the process, also leads to a\u00a0contraction in total output.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Normally, economists expect wages to be more rigid than prices.<sup>[12]<\/sup>\u00a0However, Hoover acted\u00a0<em>deliberately\u00a0<\/em>to prevent wage rates from falling.<sup>[13]<\/sup>\u00a0He essentially introduced more rigidity than normally existed. This was in opposition to those he derided as \u201cthe leave-\u200bit-\u200balone liquidationists\u201d who wanted him to do nothing.<sup>[14]<\/sup>\u00a0Adhering strictly to the high-\u200bwage doctrine, Hoover invited business leaders to a\u00a0series of White House conferences as early as November 1929. At each conference, he exhorted them to maintain wage rates\u2014an exhortation that many large employers followed as it was accompanied by a\u00a0promise to limit labor unions.<sup>[15]<\/sup>\u00a0These conferences were accompanied by behind-\u200bthe-\u200bscenes calls to forestall wage cuts.<sup>[16]<\/sup>\u00a0For a\u00a0year and a\u00a0half, Hoover was able to forestall wage cuts,<sup>[17]<\/sup>\u00a0which meant that wages were more or less stable while prices had fallen by close to 20 percent.<sup>[18]<\/sup>\u00a0While Hoover also pushed for work-\u200bsharing arrangements, which appear to have had positive effects,<sup>[19]<\/sup>\u00a0the effect of forestalling wage cuts dominated, so that the contraction was made more severe on net. Simulations of the effects of this forestalling of wage cuts find that \u201cHoover\u2019s program substantially depressed the economy, reducing aggregate output and hours worked by about 20 percent\u201d.<sup>[20]<\/sup>\u00a0More recent efforts to estimate the effect of this forestalling by using industry-\u200blevel wages (rather than economy-\u200bwide average wage rates) suggest even larger effects.<sup>[21]<\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>This policy of forestalling wage cuts also fueled a\u00a0further contraction of the money supply according to some economists. Because the falling prices combined with stable wages meant lower profits, the assets held by banks fell in value making them more fragile in the process. The decline in \u201cbusiness profits had an adverse impact on the quality of bank portfolios, causing depositors to become wary and leading to a\u00a0fall in the deposit-\u200bcurrency ratio in the economy.\u201d<sup>[22]<\/sup>\u00a0This essentially fueled the decline of the money supply, leading to a\u00a0greater need to cut wages and prices to reflect the change in monetary conditions. The contraction became more severe.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>In addition to his counterproductive policy of forestalling wage adjustment, Hoover also intervened aggressively in agricultural markets\u2014something that he had already been advocating for when he was Commerce Secretary in the Harding and Coolidge administrations.<sup>[23]<\/sup>\u00a0Under Hoover\u2019s directive, the Federal Farm Board picked two crops, wheat and cotton, and pegged their prices at a\u00a0fixed level: 80 cents\/\u200bbushel and 20 cents\/\u200bpound respectively.<sup>[24]<\/sup>\u00a0Should the market price of the farmers\u2019 goods fall below the floor, the taxpayer would buy the goods at the floor price. With prices guaranteed, farmers increased production\u2014including farmers who were producing other crops or who specialized in animal production. There was excess supply and large quantities of cotton and wheat were simply left to spoil. This overproduction became campaign fodder for Roosevelt during the 1932 election.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Finally, Hoover also adopted a\u00a0somewhat surprising fiscal policy by raising income and excise taxes and spending at the same time.<sup>[25]<\/sup>\u00a0The mainstream view among economists is that, during recessions, tax rates should not be altered and that a\u00a0temporary deficit is acceptable as long as future tax revenues are used to pay back the accumulated debt. Raising taxes during a\u00a0recession to fight a\u00a0deficit only deepens the trough. The result was to further damage economic growth. However, we should not assign too large a\u00a0role for this aspect of Hoover\u2019s policy. For the entire 1930s, when taxes were further increased by Roosevelt, the effect of tax hikes explains at best 20 percent of the slow pace of the recovery.<sup>[26]<\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<h2 id=\"flip-flopping-lynching-and-deportation-mexican-americans\" class=\"heading spacer--heading\">Flip-\u200bFlopping on Lynching and the Deportation of Mexican Americans<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Hoover\u2019s blunders were not limited to economic mismanagement. Two other policies in particular bear mentioning: his flip-\u200bflopping on lynching and his stance on deportation of Mexican Americans.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>Earlier in his political career, Hoover had expressed racially progressive views. These views probably explain why after flirting with both parties in the 1920 election, he went with the Republicans. Indeed, his views on racial matters would have made it harder for him to secure a\u00a0position on a\u00a0Democratic ticket with its strong southern base. However, once president, he practically repudiated them. Hoover purged many African-\u200bAmericans from leadership positions in the Republican Party in order to loosen the stranglehold that Democrats held on the South.<sup>[27]<\/sup>\u00a0In 1928, the Republican Party platform included a\u00a0renewed call to enact \u201cat the earliest possible date a\u00a0Federal Anti-\u200bLynching Law so that the full influence of the Federal Government may be wielded to exterminate this hideous crime\u201d. Yet, as president, Hoover resisted pushing for such legislation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>While the Republican Party had generally defended anti-\u200bimmigration policies since the 1880 election, when James Garfield had defended the idea of prohibiting Chinese immigration, Hoover took anti-\u200bimmigration policies to another level. Most notable was his appointment of William Doak as Labor Secretary. Doak selected Mexican Americans for deportation because it was claimed that many were illegal immigrants. At a\u00a0minimum, some 300,000 Mexican Americans were deported\u2014a substantial share (maybe as many as half) of whom were birthright citizens.<sup>[28]<\/sup>\u00a0While obviously hurting the living standards of the deported, Hoover\u2019s policy appears to have noticeably impoverished native-\u200bborn Americans, too.<sup>[29]<\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<h2 id=\"origin-convenient-foil\" class=\"heading spacer--heading\">The Origin of a\u00a0Convenient Foil<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>On multiple grounds, it appears clear that Hoover was not a\u00a0do-\u200bnothing president. He was proactive: not just by contemporary standards, but also by modern ones. Many of his policies, such as lobbying firms to not precipitate wage cuts, were repeated by later presidents, such as Lyndon Johnson.<sup>[30]<\/sup>\u00a0The interventions Hoover made were largely counterproductive. His tariff policy clearly deepened the contraction; it may even have caused it. His commitment to the high-\u200bwage doctrine meant the implementation of labor policies that forced further firings and closures. His fiscal policy of tax hikes was ill-\u200btimed. He flipped-\u200bflopped on racial issues while his deportation of Mexican Americans impoverished not only the deported, but also impoverished native-\u200bborn Americans.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>But why is Hoover judged poorly as a\u00a0president, exactly? It cannot be because of these poor outcomes. If assessments were based on them, then Franklin Delano Roosevelt should likewise fair poorly in presidential rankings. Indeed, the evidence tends to tilt toward saying that Roosevelt at best had no positive net effect on the economy (some policies were good, some were bad), and at worst a\u00a0net negative effect (notably through the National Industrial Recovery Act and the National Labor Relations Act). Even accounting for his wartime leadership, Roosevelt should be noticeably closer to Hoover in rankings if we are to judge them based on their similar tendencies to intervene and the equivalently disappointing results those interventions produced. Yet, Roosevelt is typically ranked quite highly\u2014which suggests there is something is being held against Hoover but not against other presidents to the same degree.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-lg body-text\">\n<p>One potentially strong explanation for this is Hoover\u2019s exceptional post-\u200bpresidential lifespan. Expelled from office in 1933, he lived for another 31\u00a0years and kept himself in the public eye.<sup>[31]<\/sup>\u00a0He repeatedly criticized Roosevelt\u2019s policies (even though they were very similar). This further marginalized him because of the clear popularity of his successor. More importantly, his criticisms of Roosevelt left the impression upon many that he was a\u00a0laissez-\u200bfaire dogmatist even though he was not. The result is the political hot poker that we know today: apply the name of Hoover to a\u00a0politician one dislikes to suggest that he cares little for the plight of those who suffer most during a\u00a0downturn. That hot poker only works because it is factually wrong on multiple grounds.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<aside class=\"columns spacer--extra\">\n<h6 class=\"columns__title border-under-text\">Related Articles<\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser podcast-teaser--alternate callout p-mb-last-child-0 default shadow small\">\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__logo\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/everything-wrong-franklin-d-roosevelt-administration\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image\" src=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2024-03\/exclusion%20order%20sf.png?itok=zKKxbFmO\" srcset=\"\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2024-03\/exclusion%20order%20sf.png?itok=zKKxbFmO 1x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2024-03\/exclusion%20order%20sf.png?itok=D3QfrNm5 1.5x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2024-03\/exclusion%20order%20sf.png?itok=D3QfrNm5 2x\" alt=\"Exclusion Order posted at First and Front Streets in San Francisco.\" width=\"80\" height=\"80\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<h6 class=\"podcast-teaser__title text-normalcase\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/everything-wrong-franklin-d-roosevelt-administration\" hreflang=\"en\">Everything Wrong with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration<\/a><\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__guests\">\n<div class=\"caption text-xs font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">David T. Beito<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser podcast-teaser--alternate callout p-mb-last-child-0 default shadow small\">\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__logo\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/everything-wrong-george-w-bush-administration\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image\" src=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2023-03\/GWBush_greyscale_0.jpg?itok=rkjh5n2X\" srcset=\"\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2023-03\/GWBush_greyscale_0.jpg?itok=rkjh5n2X 1x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2023-03\/GWBush_greyscale_0.jpg?itok=5AnTmujh 1.5x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2023-03\/GWBush_greyscale_0.jpg?itok=5AnTmujh 2x\" alt=\"A greyscale crop of George W. Bush's official photograph.\" width=\"80\" height=\"80\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<h6 class=\"podcast-teaser__title text-normalcase\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/everything-wrong-george-w-bush-administration\" hreflang=\"en\">Everything Wrong with the George W. Bush Administration<\/a><\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__guests\">\n<div class=\"caption text-xs font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">Gene Healy and Justin Logan<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser podcast-teaser--alternate callout p-mb-last-child-0 default shadow small\">\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__logo\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/office-fit-king\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image\" src=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2024-02\/george%20iii.jpg?itok=tWuBybaz\" srcset=\"\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2024-02\/george%20iii.jpg?itok=tWuBybaz 1x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2024-02\/george%20iii.jpg?itok=GWDUeyr1 1.5x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2024-02\/george%20iii.jpg?itok=GWDUeyr1 2x\" alt=\"Section from a portrait of George III\" width=\"80\" height=\"80\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<h6 class=\"podcast-teaser__title text-normalcase\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/office-fit-king\" hreflang=\"en\">An Office Fit for a\u00a0King<\/a><\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__guests\">\n<div class=\"caption text-xs font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">Matthew Feeney<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h6 class=\"columns__title border-under-text\">Related Podcasts<\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser podcast-teaser--alternate callout p-mb-last-child-0 default shadow small\">\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__logo\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/podcasts\/pop-and-locke\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image\" src=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/feed-image\/popandlockfinal-min.png?itok=elt9-MF0\" srcset=\"\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/feed-image\/popandlockfinal-min.png?itok=elt9-MF0 1x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/feed-image\/popandlockfinal-min.png?itok=tfqSLBCh 1.5x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/feed-image\/popandlockfinal-min.png?itok=tfqSLBCh 2x\" alt=\"Media Name: popandlockfinal-min.png\" width=\"80\" height=\"80\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<h6 class=\"podcast-teaser__title text-normalcase\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/podcasts\/pop-locke\/all-presidents-men\" hreflang=\"en\">All the President\u2019s Men<\/a><\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__guests\">\n<div class=\"caption text-xs font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">Gene Healy, Patrick G. Eddington, Paul Matzko, Landry Ayres, &amp; Natalie Dowzicky<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser podcast-teaser--alternate callout p-mb-last-child-0 default shadow small\">\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__logo\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/podcasts\/portraits-liberty\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image\" src=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=3p7ZXlWX\" srcset=\"\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=3p7ZXlWX 1x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=ctLJZbMX 1.5x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=ctLJZbMX 2x\" alt=\"Portraits of Liberty new logo\" width=\"80\" height=\"80\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<h6 class=\"podcast-teaser__title text-normalcase\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/podcasts\/portraits-liberty\/english-cato-algernon-sidney\" hreflang=\"en\">The English Cato: Algernon Sidney<\/a><\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__guests\">\n<div class=\"caption text-xs font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">Paul Meany<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser podcast-teaser--alternate callout p-mb-last-child-0 default shadow small\">\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__logo\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/podcasts\/portraits-liberty\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image\" src=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=3p7ZXlWX\" srcset=\"\/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=3p7ZXlWX 1x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=ctLJZbMX 1.5x, \/sites\/libertarianism.org\/files\/styles\/podcast_detail_logo_small_2x\/public\/2025-04\/Portraits%20big%20logo%20new.png?itok=ctLJZbMX 2x\" alt=\"Portraits of Liberty new logo\" width=\"80\" height=\"80\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<h6 class=\"podcast-teaser__title text-normalcase\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/podcasts\/portraits-liberty\/john-stuart-mills-co-author-harriet-taylor-mill\" hreflang=\"en\">John Stuart Mill\u2019s Co-\u200bauthor Harriet Taylor Mill<\/a><\/h6>\n<div class=\"podcast-teaser__guests\">\n<div class=\"caption text-xs font-italic p-mb-last-child-0\">Paul Meany<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/aside>\n<div class=\"article-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"text-alt-sm callout p-mb-last-child-0 default\">\n<ol>\n<li>Pietrusza, D. (2009).\u00a0<em>1920: The Year of the Six Presidents<\/em>. Hachette UK.<\/li>\n<li>Newman, P. (2014). The depression of 1873-1879: an Austrian perspective.\u00a0<em>Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>17<\/em>(4), 474-510; Newman, P. (2016). The depression of 1920\u20131921: a\u00a0credit induced boom and a\u00a0market based recovery?\u00a0<em>The Review of Austrian Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>29<\/em>(4), 387-414; Kuehn, D. (2012). A\u00a0note on America\u2019s 1920\u201321 depression as an argument for austerity.\u00a0<em>Cambridge Journal of Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>36<\/em>(1), 155-160; Kuehn, D. (2011). A\u00a0critique of Powell, Woods, and Murphy on the 1920\u20131921 depression.\u00a0<em>Review of Austrian Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>24<\/em>(3), 273-291; Vernon, J. R. (1991). The 1920<span lang=\"EN-CA\">\u2010<\/span><span lang=\"EN-CA\">21 deflation: the role of aggregate supply.\u00a0<em>Economic Inquiry<\/em>,\u00a0<em>29<\/em>(3), 572-580; Roulleau<\/span><span lang=\"EN-CA\">\u2010<\/span><span lang=\"EN-CA\">Pasdeloup, J., and Zhutova, A. (2021). Labor market policies in a\u00a0deep recession: lessons from Hoover\u2019s policies during the U.S. great depression.\u00a0<em>Journal of Money, Credit and Banking<\/em>; Vedder, R.K., and Gallaway, L.E. (1997).\u00a0<em>Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth Century America.\u00a0<\/em>Independent Institute, pp. 61-70.<\/span><\/li>\n<li>For the effects of Roosevelt\u2019s policies that may have deepened the recession, the following works are useful:\u00a0Taylor, J. E., and Klein, P. G. (2008). An anatomy of a\u00a0cartel: The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the compliance crisis of 1934. In\u00a0<em>Research in Economic History<\/em>. Emerald Group Publishing Limited; Neumann, T. C., Taylor, J. E., and Fishback, P. (2013). Comparisons of weekly hours over the past century and the importance of work-\u200bsharing policies in the 1930s.\u00a0<em>American Economic Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>103<\/em>(3), 105-10; Taylor, J. E. (2007). Cartel code attributes and cartel performance: an industry-\u200blevel analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act.\u00a0<em>Journal of Law and Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>50<\/em>(3), 597-624; Taylor, J. E., and Neumann, T. C. (2016). Recovery spring, faltering fall: March to November 1933.\u00a0<em>Explorations in Economic History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>61<\/em>, 54-67; Taylor, J. E. (2019).\u00a0<em>Deconstructing the Monolith<\/em>. University of Chicago Press; Gallaway, L. E., and Vedder, R. K. (2017). The great depression: a\u00a0tale of three paradigms. In\u00a0<em>Explorations in Public Sector Economics<\/em>\u00a0(pp. 51-60). Springer, Cham; Mathy, G. P. (2020). How much did uncertainty shocks matter in the Great Depression?\u00a0<em>Cliometrica<\/em>,\u00a0<em>14<\/em>(2), 283-323; Cole, H. L., and Ohanian, L. E. (2004). New deal policies and the persistence of the great depression: a\u00a0general equilibrium analysis.\u00a0<em>Journal of Political Economy<\/em>,\u00a0<em>112<\/em>(4), 779-816; Ohanian, L. E. (2001). Why did productivity fall so much during the great depression?\u00a0<em>American Economic Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>91<\/em>(2), 34-38; Sumner, S. (2015).\u00a0<em>The Midas Paradox: Financial Markets, Government Policy Shocks, and the Great Depression<\/em>. Independent Institute; Folsom, B. W. (2009).\u00a0<em>New Deal or Raw Deal? How FDR\u2019s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America<\/em>. Simon and Schuster. For contemporary criticisms of the Roosevelt policies, see Wolman, L. (1938). Wage rates.<em>\u00a0American Economic Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>28<\/em>(1), 126-131.<\/li>\n<li>Friedman, M., and Schwartz, A. J. 1967.\u00a0<em>A\u00a0Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960<\/em>. Princeton University Press; Selgin, G., Lastrapes, W. D., and White, L. H. (2012). Has the Fed been a\u00a0failure?\u00a0<em>Journal of Macroeconomics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>34<\/em>(3), 569-596; Wheelock, D. C. (1992). Monetary policy in the great depression: What the Fed did, and why. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<em>\u00a0Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>74<\/em>(2), 3-28; Romer, C. D., and Romer, D. H. (2013). The missing transmission mechanism in the monetary explanation of the great depression.\u00a0<em>American Economic Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>103<\/em>(3), 66-72; Anderson, G. M., Shughart, W. F., and Tollison, R. D. (1988). A\u00a0public choice theory of the great contraction.\u00a0<em>Public Choice<\/em>,\u00a0<em>59<\/em>(1), 3-23; Smiley, G. (1991). Can Keynesianism explain the 1930s? Reply to Cowen.\u00a0<em>Critical Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>5<\/em>(1), 81-114.<\/li>\n<li>There is a\u00a0smaller group that argues for institutional shocks, notably\u00a0Albrecht Ritschl of the LSE who points to Roosevelt\u2019s pro-\u200blabor policies (i.e. more collective bargaining) coupled with rising industrial concentration on many markets as the culprit. In the presence of firms with large market shares (i.e. market power), there are rents. Unions and collective bargaining mean that these rents are shared with firm-\u200bowners. However, this also means a\u00a0reduction in output, investment and hirings as well. However, Ritschl argues that it was Hoover who promoted industrial concentration (notably as secretary of commerce under presidents Harding and Coolidge) such that, when Roosevelt introduced collective bargaining and unionization, a\u00a0perfect storm occurred. Ritschl\u2019s work is interesting and has, unfortunately, been ignored in large part because the work is still in working paper format (Ebell, M., and Ritschl, A. (2008). Real origins of the great depression: monopoly power, unions and the American business cycle in the 1920s (No. 876). Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science). Scholars interested in studying the effects of presidential policies should investigate this possibility further. For our purposes here, it adds an additional possibility through which Hoover might have sown the seeds of a\u00a0deeper depression much earlier than 1930.<\/li>\n<li>Vedder, R.K., and Gallaway, L.E. (1997).\u00a0<em>Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth Century America.\u00a0<\/em>Independent Institute, p. 97.<\/li>\n<li>Smiley, G. (2002).\u00a0<em>Rethinking the Great Depression<\/em>. Ivan R. Dee, p. 14.<\/li>\n<li>Smiley, G. (2002).\u00a0<em>Rethinking the Great Depression<\/em>. Ivan R. Dee, p. 97.<\/li>\n<li>Crucini, M. J., and Kahn, J. (1996). Tariffs and aggregate economic activity: lessons from the great depression.\u00a0<em>Journal of Monetary Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>38<\/em>(3), 427-467; Bond, E. W., Crucini, M. J., Potter, T., and Rodrigue, J. (2013). Misallocation and productivity effects of the Smoot\u2013Hawley tariff.\u00a0<em>Review of Economic Dynamics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>16<\/em>(1), 120-134; Meltzer, A. H. (1976). Monetary and other explanations of the start of the great depression.\u00a0<em>Journal of Monetary Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>2<\/em>(4), 455-471; Rustici, T. C. (2005).\u00a0<em>The Economic effects of the Smoot-\u200bHawley Act of 1930 and the Beginning of the Great Depression<\/em>. George Mason University; Rustici, T. C. (2005).\u00a0<em>Lessons from the Great Depression: The Economic Effects of the Smoot-\u200bHawley Act of 1930 and the Beginning of the Great Depression<\/em>. Capitalism Works Publishing.<\/li>\n<li>Taylor, J., and Selgin, G. (1999). By our Bootstraps: origins and effects of the high-\u200bwage doctrine and the minimum wage.\u00a0<em>Journal of Labor Research<\/em>,\u00a0<em>20<\/em>(4), 447-462; Beaudreau, B. C., and Taylor, J. E. (2018). Why did the Roosevelt administration think cartels, higher wages, and shorter workweeks would promote recovery from the great depression?\u00a0<em>Independent Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>23<\/em>(1), 91-107; Smiley, G. (1987). Some Austrian perspectives on Keynesian fiscal policy and the recovery in the thirties.\u00a0<em>Review of Austrian Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>1<\/em>(1), 145-179.<\/li>\n<li>Cited in\u00a0Rothbard, M. N. (1972).\u00a0<em>America\u2019s Great Depression<\/em>. Ludwig von Mises Institute, pp. 236-237. It should be noted that Rothbard\u2019s work is often ignored but that some of it has been encompassed implicitly in the economics literature. Economist Lee Ohanian of UCLA recently pointed out to me that Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas had suggested to him that he acquire a\u00a0copy of Rothbard\u2019s\u00a0<em>America\u2019s<\/em>\u00a0<em>Great Depression\u00a0<\/em>for the purposes of his work because many elements were of value to the research.<\/li>\n<li>For a\u00a0good conversation of the topic, see\u00a0Madsen, J. B. (2004). Price and wage stickiness during the great depression.\u00a0<em>European Review of Economic History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>8<\/em>(3), 263-295.<\/li>\n<li>MacKenzie, D. W. (2010). Industrial employment and the policies of Herbert C. Hoover.\u00a0<em>Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>13<\/em>(3), 101-120; Vedder, R., and Gallaway, L.E. (2011). Hoover and wages in the depression: a\u00a0comment on Douglas Mackenzie: a\u00a0rejoinder.\u00a0<em>Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics<\/em>,\u00a0<em>14<\/em>(4), 454; Rose, J. D. (2010). Hoover\u2019s truce: wage rigidity in the onset of the great depression.\u00a0<em>Journal of Economic History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>70<\/em>(4), 843-870; Ohanian, L. E. (2009). What\u2013or who\u2013started the great depression?.\u00a0<em>Journal of Economic Theory<\/em>,\u00a0<em>144<\/em>(6), 2310-2335.<\/li>\n<li>Cited in\u00a0Rothbard, M. N. (1972).\u00a0<em>America\u2019s Great Depression<\/em>. Ludwig von Mises Institute, p.187.<\/li>\n<li>Rothbard, M.N. (1972).\u00a0<em>America\u2019s Great Depression<\/em>. Ludwig von Mises Institute, pp. 188-189.<\/li>\n<li>Rose, J. D. (2010). Hoover\u2019s truce: wage rigidity in the onset of the great depression.\u00a0<em>Journal of Economic History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>70<\/em>(4), p. 854.<\/li>\n<li>Rose, J. D. (2010). Hoover\u2019s truce: wage rigidity in the onset of the great depression.\u00a0<em>Journal of Economic History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>70<\/em>(4), p. 868.<\/li>\n<li>Rothbard, M.N. (1972).\u00a0<em>America\u2019s Great Depression<\/em>. Ludwig von Mises Institute, p. 236.<\/li>\n<li>Taylor, J. E. (2011). Work<span lang=\"EN-CA\">\u2010<\/span><span lang=\"EN-CA\">sharing during the great depression: Did the \u2018President\u2019s Reemployment Agreement\u2019 promote reemployment?\u00a0<em>Economica<\/em>,\u00a0<em>78<\/em>(309), 133-158.<\/span><\/li>\n<li>Ohanian, L. E. (2009). What\u2013or who\u2013started the great depression?\u00a0<em>Journal of Economic Theory<\/em>,\u00a0<em>144<\/em>(6), p. 2311.<\/li>\n<li>Taylor, J.E., and Xue, W. (2022). An industry-\u200blevel panel analysis of Vedder and Gallaway\u2019s adjusted real wage model in the interwar era. Working Paper. This working paper by Taylor and Xue provides a\u00a0partial resolution to criticisms leveled at some of the work regarding the policy-\u200binduced wage rigidity\u2014see notably\u00a0De Long, J. B. (1998). It doesn\u2019t work.\u00a0<em>Critical Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>12<\/em>(1-2), 59-69.<\/li>\n<li>Vedder, R.K., and Gallaway, L.E. (1997).\u00a0<em>Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth Century America.\u00a0<\/em>Independent Institute, p. 124.<\/li>\n<li>Fausold, M. L. (1977). President Hoover\u2019s farm policies 1929-1933.\u00a0<em>Agricultural History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>51<\/em>(2), 362-377; Wilson, J. H. (1977). Hoover\u2019s agricultural policies 1921-1928.\u00a0<em>Agricultural History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>51<\/em>(2), 335-361; Hoffman, E., and Libecap, G. D. (1991). Institutional choice and the development of U.S. agricultural policies in the 1920s.\u00a0<em>Journal of Economic History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>51<\/em>(2), 397-411.<\/li>\n<li>Folsom, B. W. (2009).\u00a0<em>New Deal or Raw Deal? How FDR\u2019s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America<\/em>. Simon and Schuster, p. 78.<\/li>\n<li>Horwitz, S. (2011). Herbert Hoover: father of the new deal. Cato Institute Briefing Paper, no. 122.<\/li>\n<li>Cole, H. L., and Ohanian, L. E. (1999). The great depression in the United States from a\u00a0neoclassical perspective. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis<em>\u00a0Quarterly Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>23<\/em>, p. 5.<\/li>\n<li>Garcia, G. F. (1980). Black disaffection from the Republican Party during the presidency of Herbert Hoover.\u00a0<em>Annals of Iowa<\/em>,\u00a0<em>45<\/em>, pp. 462-464.<\/li>\n<li>Hoffman, A. (1973). Stimulus to repatriation: The 1931 federal deportation drive and the Los Angeles Mexican community.\u00a0<em>Pacific Historical Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>42<\/em>(2), 205-219; Gratton, B., and Merchant, E. (2013). Immigration, repatriation, and deportation: The Mexican-\u200borigin population in the United States, 1920\u20131950.\u00a0<em>International Migration Review<\/em>,\u00a0<em>47<\/em>(4), 944-975.<\/li>\n<li>Lee, J., Peri, G., and Yasenov, V. (2017). The employment effects of Mexican repatriations: evidence from the 1930\u2019s (Working Paper no.23885). National Bureau of Economic Research.<\/li>\n<li>Johnson frequently pushed for conferences to negotiate wage and price hikes or delaying wage and price hikes. Eisenhower and Kennedy also engaged in such practices. See\u00a0Milner, S. (2019). Assuming direct control: the beguiling allure of incomes policies in postwar America.\u00a0<em>Journal of Policy History<\/em>,\u00a0<em>31<\/em>(1), 42-71.<\/li>\n<li>Belenky, I. (1999). The making of the ex-\u200bpresidents, 1797-1993: Six recurrent models.\u00a0<em>Presidential Studies Quarterly<\/em>,\u00a0<em>29<\/em>(1), pp. 157-158.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p>____<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/everything-wrong-hoover-administration\">https:\/\/www.libertarianism.org\/articles\/everything-wrong-hoover-administration<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Everything Wrong with the Hoover Administration<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-18988","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18988","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=18988"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18988\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=18988"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=18988"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.info\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=18988"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}